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 2.  Report Date: 03 Feb 84
 3.  SOVIET TREATMENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN SINCE NOVEMBER 1980
 4.  The treatment accorded an American president in Soviet
 authoritative statements and media commentary is a sensitive
 barometer of Soviet expectations for relations with Washington.
 Historically, Soviet efforts to promote an improved climate of
 relations with the United States have been accompanied by
 corresponding restraints on public criticism of the President and his
 policies.
 5.  Since President Reagan's election in November 1980, Moscow has
 twice significantly modified its propaganda line to test the
 prospects for reduced bilateral tensions.  In the immediate aftermath
 of the elections, Soviet media pictured the new Administration in
 positive terms suggesting that it would reverse the deterioration in
 bilateral relations and that President-elect Reagan h
 anti-Soviet views he had expressed during the campaign.  This early
 period of professed optimism quickly gave way to strident low-level
 media criticism of the Administration and to direct, if less
 strident, attacks on the President himself.  Soviet political leaders
 continued to abide by their normal strictures against attacking a
 U.S. president directly even though already by May 1981 they were
 strongly indicting President Reagan's policies.  These respective
 media and leadership practices were followed until Brezhnev's death,
 with the exception of a brief interlude of more moderate comment in
 late 1981 between the time when the Administration agreed to begin
 arms control talks in Geneva and the imposition of U.S. sanctions in
 response to martial law in Poland.
 6.  Andropov's accession to power brought a second, more tentative
 Soviet effort to promote an improved U.S.-Soviet climate.  Soviet
 leaders and prominent Soviet specialists on the United States muted
 their attacks on Washington, which had become particularly harsh in
 the last months of the Brezhnev regime, and expressed receptivity to
 any U.S. gestures for improved relations.  This selective restraint
 on criticism--routine Soviet propaganda was little affected--lasted
 only until early spring 1983, when the contention over INF
 deployments and other issues took its toll.
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 7. In the aftermath of the shooting down of the Korean airliner last
 September Moscow gave what is almost surely the most abusive Soviet
 treatment of an American President at least since Brezhnev became
 CPSU general secretary in 1964.  Moscow has reduced the sharpness of
 its criticism only marginally since then in its routine propaganda.
 The leadership, on the other hand, a more sensitive indicator of
 changes in approach, has offered one significant indication of a
 desire to lower the decibel level of its polemics directed against
 the President: Andropov's 25 January PRAVDA interview, responding to
 President Reagan's 16 January speech expressing interest in
 U.S.-Soviet dialogue, avoided stridency while expressing Moscow's
 unaltered assessment of U.S. policy.
 8.  Within this broad chronological framework, the attached Soviet
 leadership statements and media commentaries reveal the varied
 treatment accorded to President Reagan and his Administration by
 three different elements in the Soviet Union at three different
 levels of authority--the leadership itself, political commentators
 with close ties to the leadership, and the routine media
 commentators.  The pattern of behavior of each of these groups is
 distinctive:
 9. o While obviously authorizing media attacks on the President, the
 leadership until 1983 conspicuously avoided direct personal attacks
 on the President.  Even in Brezhnev's most strident criticism of U.S.
 policy, such as in his 27 October 1982 speec -to a meeing o   ov-let
 military leaders, he attacked U.S. "ruling circles," "Washington,"
 and "the line of the United States and those who follow it" without
 naming President Reagan.  The Soviet leadership broke this pattern in
 the wake of charges by the President and other Administration
 officials that the Soviet Union had deliberately and knowingly shot
 down a passenger airliner last September.  Andropov's January PRAVDA
 interview suggests that the Kremlin prefers the more moderate role
 traditionally assumed by the Soviet political leadership, according
 to which the top Soviet leader, at the very least, stands aloof from
 the excesses of the polemical fray.
 10. o Well-connected political commentators, such as Aleksandr
 Bovin, Georgiy Arbatov, Vadim Zagladin, and Nikolay Shishlin, have
 been less restrained in discussing the President's responsibility for
 the U.S. policies they have so sharply condemned.  They have also
 been the most sensitive indicator of changing perceptions about the
 direction of U.S.-Soviet relations.  It was in the comments of these
 officials about the Administration that fluctuations in Soviet
 expectations for U.S.-Soviet cooperation were most clearly
 registered.
 11. o Routine commentary has been the least sensitive barometer of
 changes in the atmosphere for U.S.-Soviet relations.  When President
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 Reagan was elected, it was more optimistic than some Soviet political
 observers.  When the outlines of Administration policy toward the
 Soviet Union became clear, the low-level commentary assumed a hostile
 tone that it has periodically intensified but from which in general
 it has not since departed.
 13.  Premier Nikolay Tikhonov, October Revolution anniversary speech
 (PRAVDA, 7Nov 80)
 14.  Regarding our relations with the United States of America, just
 as with any other country which belongs to a different social system,
 they can only be built up on the basis of equality, noninterference
 in internal affairs, not causing harm to the security of one another.
 15.  I would like to express the hope that the new Administration in
 the White House will manifest a constructive approach to questions or
 relations between our countries.
 16.  General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Kremlin dinner speech
 (PRAVDA, 18 Nov 80)
 17.  Much in the development of the international situation wilh_of
 course, depend on the position of the United States.  A new President
 has now been elected there.  I shall not dwell on what was said by
 him and his supporters and opponents in the heat of the election
 struggle.  I can only state with full responsibility that any
 constructive steps by the U.S. Administration in the field of
 Soviet-American relations and urgent world problems will meet with a
 positive response on our part.
 18.  TASS statement (PRAVDA, 3 Feb 81)
 19.  Soviet leading circles have taken note of a new anti-Soviet
 hostile campaign being unfolded in the United States.  This time they
 ascribe to the Soviet Union involvement in "international terrorism."
 Such inventions could be simply ignored as a new primitive trick by
 professional anti-Soviets if not for the fact that this campaign was
 started by high-ranking officials of the American Administration
 including U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig.  His statements, made at a
 press conference on 28 January this year, and subsequent additional
 comments made by another official representative of the U.S. State
 Department, clearly indicate that this is not a matter of some
 occasional unhappy expression but a deliberate political subversion.
 20.  Soviet leading circles would like to hope that they in
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 Washington will give serious thought as to what the continuation
 there of the campaign hostile to the Soviet Union can lead and will
 take measures to stop it.
 21.  Soviet Minister of Defense Dmitriy Ustinov (PRAVDA, 21 Feb 81)
 22.  The new U.S. Administration is making increasingly clear
 attempts to adopt an absolutely futile "position of strength" with
 regard to the USSR.  It is perfectly obvious that such an approach is
 fundamentally at variance with the interests of both the American and
 the Soviet peoples and with the interests of all mankind.
 23.  Brezhnev, speech to 26th CPSU Congress (PRAVDA, 24 Feb 81)
 24.  Unfortunately, the previous Washington Administration by no
 means considered the development of relations, mutual understanding.
 Attempting to exert pressure on us, it began to destroy all the
 positive results which had been scored with no little difficulty in
 Soviet-American relations over the preceding years. . . .
 25.  Even after the change of leadership in the White House, candidly
 bellicose calls and statements are being heard from Washington, calls
 and statements which seem to be specially intended to poison the
 atmosphere of relations between our countries.  In any case, we would
 like to hope that those who now determine U.S. policy will ultimately
 be able to look at things more realistically. . . .
 26.  The present state of relations between us and the sharpness of
 international problems demanding solution dictate the need for
 dialogue at all levels and, what is more, an active dialogue.  We are
 ready for dialogue.  Experience shows that the decisive link here is
 meetings at the highest level.
 27.  Brezhnev, speech in Kiev (PRAVDA, 10 May 81)
 28.  There are quite a few sober-minded people among those who today
 shape the policy of capitalist countries.  They understand that the
 emphasis on strength, the emphasis on war in relations with the
 socialist world is madness in our day and age, that there is only one
 reasonable road--peaceful coexistence, mutually advantageous
 cooperation.
 29.  But there are also such statesmen in the bourgeois world who,
 judging by everything, are accustomed to thinking only in terms of
 strength and diktat.  They actually regard the attainment of military
 superiority over the Soviet Union as their main political credo.  The
 solution of international problems by way of talks and mutually
 advantageous agreements appears to be way down their list of
 priorities, if they give serious thought to this at all.
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 30.  Among them there are also those who openly state that peace is
 not the most important matter, that there are things more important
 than peace.
 31.  Just think, comrades: Can one imagine a more horrendous
 position, a more cynical disregard for the destinies of peoples,
 including one's own people, for the lives of hundreds of millions of
 people!  . . .
 32.  This is not to mention how absurd are any plans which are
 intended by means of threats, economic blockade or military
 aggression to impede the development of socialist countries or the
 struggle of peoples for national freedom and social justice. . . .
 33.  As for the Soviet Union, it is not the first time that we are
 hearing inventions about our policy, slander, and threats.  But we do
 not give in to intimidations.
 34.  Marshal Viktor Kulikov, First Deputy Minister of Defense, and
 Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact
 Nations (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Jun 81)
 35.  If you look at the statements of the leaders of the present U.S.
 Administration, you cannot help noticing in them a similarity with
 the aims set by the Hitlerite leadership in attacking the Soviet
 Union.  Speaking at Notre Dame in June, R. Reagan said: "The West
 will outlive communism. . . . We will write it off as a sad,
 unnatural chapter in the history of mankind."
 36.  Ustinov (PRAVDA, 25 Jul 81)
 37.  The ruling circles of Washington have decided to overturn all
 the positive elements in Soviet-American relations achieved during
 the seventies and to break down the approximate equality in the
 military sphere between the USSR and the United States.
 38.  Without putting forward any positive initiatives the Reagan
 Administration has taken a standpoint of unconcealed anti-Sovietism.
 At the same time it is grossly interfering in the affairs of other
 states and is high-handedly dictating its demands to them.
 Washington has launched a broad offensive against the
 national-liberation movements in Africa, Asia and particularly in
 Latin America, is giving every sort of support to antipopular
 regimes, and is putting arms, equipment, military advisers and money
 at their disposal. . . .
 39.  The ruling circles of the United States are intensifying
 international tension and exacerbating Soviet-American relations.
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 40.  The present American Administration is elevating to the rank of
 state policy interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states
 and the open attack against national liberation movements. .  . .
 41.  Washington, once again, as a decade ago, is trying to speak to
 the Soviet Union in the language of "cold war." At the same time, its
 disregard for agreements which were reached between our two countries
 in the field of arms restriction is demonstrated.  A. Haig states:
 "We are not very concerned about the understandings of 1972, although
 they were agreed by both sides."
 42.  Brezhnev, interview with DER SPIEGEL (PRAVDA, 3 Nov 81)
 43.  There is no quiet in the world today.  'Hot spots' are emerging
 in different parts of the world.  The race of death-carrying weapons
 is continuing.  New types of them are created, which are particularly
 dangerous because they, as experts say, lower the threshold of
 nuclear war, i.e., make its outbreak more probable.  Under these
 conditions the speculation of some strategists and politicians in the
 West on the admissibility of some 'limited' nuclear war and the
 possibility to win a victory in it looks particularly insidious. . .
 44.  So, those who possibly hope to. set fie to     nuclear power
 keg, while themselves sitting snug aside, should not entertain any
 illusions. . . .
 45.  Unfortunately, the leading powers of the West, above all, the
 NATO bloc, do not show so far a serious interest in talks on all of
 these questions that are vital to mankind and its peaceful future.
 Some people there are by far more willing to speak not on detente,
 but on confrontation; not on peaceful mutually beneficial
 cooperation, but on the use of trade to military-strategic ends; not
 on agreements on the basis of equality and equal security, but on
 diktat from the positions of military supremacy; not on the
 elimination by joint efforts of seats of conflicts, but on the
 creation of ever new military bases, on the buildup of their military
 presence in various parts of the world; not on curbing the arms race,
 but on 'rearmament'; not on a limitation or prohibition of some or
 other types of weapons, but on the creation of ever new, even more
 destructive means of mass annihilation of people.
 46.  This way, unfortunately, they not only speak, but also act in
 practice.  You, certainly, understand that I have in mind, above all,
 the policy of the present U.S. Administration, the way it was
 manifest both in statements by high-ranking statesmen of that country
 and, which is even more important, in their practical deeds.
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 47.  All of it is actually an opposite to detente, blunt disregard
 for the striving of all peoples for lasting peace.       And it is,
 certainly, profoundly deplorable that the leaders of one of the
 world's biggest powers have deemed it possible to build their policy
 on such a basis. . . .
 48.  President Reagan has recently expressed the readiness of the
 United States to discuss with the Soviet Union also other problems,
 which cause differences between the two countries.  We welcome such
 readiness, as we have always considered talks to be the most
 appropriate method of resolving international problems.  The main
 thing, of course, is that appropriate practical deeds should be
 matched to correct words.
 49.  And it would be better to abandon dreams of ensuring military
 supremacy over the USSR.
 50.  Minister of Defense Ustinov, October Revolution anniversary
 speech (PRAVDA, 7 Nov 81)
 51.  Washington is accelerating the buildup of the might of the NATO
 military machine and is seeking an expansion of the field of action
 of that aggressive bloc, spreading the system of its military bases
 to new territories. . . .
 52.  The Washington Administration is with increasing frequency
 resorting to frankly inflammatory language.  High-ranking U.S.
 representatives, with cynical disregard for the fate of the peoples,
 state that there are allegedly some things more important than peace.
 53.  The preservation of peace is inseparable from the curbing of the
 arms race--from stage-by-stage disarmament.  Important steps in that
 direction were taken in the seventies.  But the present U.S.
 Administration is intent on casting doubt on all the positive things
 that have been jointly achieved in the field of Soviet-U.S.
 relations.  It openly declares its intention to speak to the Soviet
 Union from positions of strength.
 54.  TASS statement on U.S. Stance on Poland (PRAVDA, 14 Jan 82)
 55.  The United States and its NATO allies are continuing attempts at
 crudely interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state--the
 Polish People's Republic, at whipping up international tensions.
 This has been most clearly revealed also in the statement, which was
 issued on 11 January by the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic
 Alliance.
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 56.  It is well known that the whole of this disgraceful farce has
 been initiated by the U.S. Administration.  Its style is felt both in
 the impudent distortion of facts, the high-handed tones, and
 excessive political ambitions.
 57.  Yes, Washington makes no little effort to try to bring abut a
 turnaround in international politics from detente to confrontation
 between blocs.  Why is it done?  It is not too difficult to answer
 this question.
 58.  What it amounts to is above all an attempt at crowding socialism
 and impairing the positions of the USSR and other socialist countries
 on the European and world scene.  Certain figures of the imperialist
 camp are day and night beset by nightmares because socialism is
 growing stronger.  The international positions of socialism rely on
 the existing balance of forces in Europe and in the world, and are
 guaranteed by the might of the socialist community.
 59.  Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, First Deputy Minister of Defense and
 Chief of the General Staff (ALWAYS IN READINESS TO DEFEND THE
 HOMELAND, Moscow: Voenizdat, approved for publication 26 Jan 82)
 60.  World imperialism, and particularly U.S. imperialism, is seeking
 to extend its tentacles into every part of the world.  Militant U.S.
 circles have openly adopted a course of polite aimed at undermining__
 detente, engagement in a massive arms race, and vigorous jaktivnuyul
 preparations for nuclear war.  The various actions and acts of
 sabotage against the USSR and the other nations of the socialist
 community and against progressive forces throughout the world which
 they are presently conducting are of a coordinated nature and are
 joined together by a. common scheme.  The main goal which the U.S.
 imperialists have set for themselves is gradually and sequentially to
 weaken and undermine socialism as a system, using any and all methods
 and means, and ultimately to establish their world domination.
 61.  This is not a new phenomenon.  History has seen many claimants
 to world domination.  Napoleon persistently sought to achieve world
 domination, as did Hitler at a later time.  The outcome of their
 ambitions is well known.  An even harsher outcome may await these
 latter-day claimants.
 62.  Brezhnev, Soviet Trade Union Congress speech (PRAVDA, 17 Mar 82)
 63.  The newly fledged devotees of cold war and dangerous balancing
 on the brink of a real war would like nothing better than to tear up
 the legal and ethical norms of relations between states that have
 taken shape over the centuries and to cancel their independence and
 sovereignty.  They are trying to retailer the political map of the
 world, and have declared large regions on all continents as zones of
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 their "vital interests." They have arrogated the "right" to command
 some countries, and to judge and  punish" others.  Unembarrassed,
 they publicly announce, and try to carry out, plans for economic and
 political "destablization" of governments and states that are not to
 their liking.  With unexampled cynicism they gloat over difficulties
 experienced by this or that nation.  They are trying to substitute
 "sanctions" and blockades for normal communications and international
 trade, and endless threats of armed force, not short of threats to
 use nuclear weapons, for contacts and negotiations.
 64.  It is simply astonishing to see it all.  And you cannot help
 asking yourself: What is there more of in this
 policy--thoughtlessness and lack of experience in international
 affairs, or irresponsibility and, to say it bluntly, an adventurist
 approach to problems crucial for the destiny of mankind?  Not in our
 country, but in the columns of respectable organs of the U.S.
 bourgeois press this policy was described as "a course to political
 disaster." It is hard to deny the validity of this description.
 65.  Brezhnev, PRAVDA interview (PRAVDA, 18 Apr 82)
 66.  I already spoke on the value of an active dialogue with the
 United states at all levels, especially emphasizing that the decisive
 link here is summit level meetings.  Today we also support such
 meetings.  It is understandable that a meeting between the_U.S.
 President and myself must be well-prepared and conducted properly,
 not just in passing in connection with some international forum or
 other.
 67.  Yuriy Andropov, Politburo member and Chairman of the KGB, Lenin
 anniversary speech (PRAVDA, 23 Apr 82)
 68.  The imperialist bourgeoisie, frightened by the upsurge of the
 antiwar movements, is making ever-wider use of the weapons of lies
 and sophisticated deception.  What is Washington doing now?  One
 hysterical propaganda campaign replaces the other.  People are at one
 moment being persuaded of a Soviet military threat, then lied to
 unscrupulously about the lagging behind of the United States,
 intimidated with international terrorism, fed cock-and-bull stories
 about events in Poland, Central America, South and Southeast Asia.
 69.  Attempts are made to make use of diplomatic talks themselves in
 order to deceive the public, among them talks on the limitation of
 arms and on disarmament.  The impression is created that often they
 are entered into only to create illusions and, by lulling public
 vigilance, continue the arms race. . . .
 70.  But certain governments as well as people are inclined, as is
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 apparent, to forget the experience and lessons of history.   It would
 seem that this is now happening to the Washington Administration,
 which is trying to steer the entire development of international
 relations onto a dangerous path.  Of course the United States will
 not be successful in this.  But we must not ignore the fact that such
 policies on the whole worsen the situation and increase the danger of
 war.
 71.  The only answer to this can be increased vigilance and, at the
 same time, a still more stubborn struggle to preserve peace.
 72.  Brezhnev, Komsomol congress speech (PRAVDA, 19 May 82)
 73.  President Reagan, on his part, has now declared that the United
 States is ready for the resumption of the talks.  In our opinion,
 this is a step in the right direction.  It is , however, important
 that the talks should begin immediately in the right key.
 74.  In the same speech the President said that the United States at
 the talks would be in favor of substantial reductions.  Well, we have
 always been in favor of substantial reductions of strategic arms,
 there is no need to persuade us in this respect.
 75.  But if one looks at the essence of the ideas voiced by the U.S.
 President on such reductions, one notes unfortunately that the
 American position is absolutely unilateral in nature.  Above all,
 because the United States would like in general to exclude from the
 talks the strategic arms it is now most intensively developing.
 76.  Brezhnev speech at Kremlin meeting of military commanders
 (PRAVDA, 28 Oct 82)
 77.  The ruling circles of the United States of America have launched
 a political, ideological, and economic offensive on socialism and
 have raised the intensity of their military preparations to an
 unprecedented level. . . .
 78.  The masses of people on all continents angrily protest against
 Washington's aggressive policy which is threatening to push the world
 into the flames of a nuclear war.  The adventurism, rudeness, and
 undisguised egoism of this policy arouse growing indignation in many
 countries, including those allied with the United States. . . .
 79.  The line of the United States and those who follow it is a line
 for deepening tension and aggravating the situation to a maximum.
 They are dreaming of isolating politically and weakening economically
 the USSR and its friends.  They have unfolded an unprecedented arms
 race, especially a nuclear arms race, and are trying to attain
 military superiority.  Having stepped on this road, imperialism is
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 irresponsibly playing with the destinies of the peoples.
 80.  TASS report of 15 November 1982 meeting between General
 Secretary Andropov and Vice President Bush (PRAVDA, 16 Nov 82)
 81.  In this respect Yu. V. Andropov stressed that the Soviet Union,
 consistently carrying out a policy of peace, is prepared to build
 relations with the United States on a basis of full equality,
 noninterference, mutual respect in the interests of the peoples of
 both countries, and normalization [ozdorovleniye] of the
 international situation.
 82.  Tikhonov, Kremlin dinner speech to U.S. trade delegation
 (PRAVDA, 19 Nov 82)
 83.  We are meeting with you at a time which is not the best for
 Soviet-American relations.  Their climate has considerably cooled and
 to be frank, not through our fault.
 84.  The official stand taken in the United States towards the Soviet
 Union, naturally, is also reflected in trade between our countries.
 All sorts of discriminatory measures, attempts to use various
 sanctions, embargoes, etc., against our country do not, of course,
 inspire kind feelings, but rather undermine the confidence of Soviet
 foreign trade organizations in the American market. . . .
 85.  The Soviet Union has been and is for normal, and even better,
 friendly relations with the United States.  There were such relations
 in the past, and they can again become a reality.  This would meet
 the interests of our countries and the interests of universal peace.
 I am confident that this is precisely what our peoples wish.  They
 wish lasting peace and mutually beneficial cooperation.
 86.  Andropov, speech at CPSU Central Committee plenum (PRAVDA, 23
 Nov 82)
 87.  All are equally interested in preserving peace and detente.
 Therefore, statements in which the readiness for normalizing
 relations is linked with the demand that the Soviet Union pay for
 this with preliminary concessions in different fields, do not sound
 serious, to say the least.  We shall not agree to this and, properly
 speaking, we have nothing to cancel: We did not introduce sanctions
 against anyone, we did not denounce treaties and agreements that were
 signed, and we did not interrupt talks that were started.  I should
 like to stress once more that the Soviet Union stands for accord but
 this should be sought on the basis of reciprocity and equality.
 88.  In our opinion the point of talks with the United States and
 other Western countries, primarily on questions of restraining the
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 arms race, does not lie in the statement of differences.  For us
 talks are a way of joining efforts by different states in order to
 achieve' results useful to all sides.  The problems will not disappear
 by themselves if the talks are held for the sake of talks, as it
 unfortunately happens not infrequently.  We are for the search on a
 healthy basis, acceptable to the sides concerned, for a settlement of
 the most complicated problems, especially of course, the problems of
 curbing the arms race, involving both nuclear and conventional arms.
 But let no one expect unilateral disarmament from us.  We are not
 naive people.
 89.  We do not demand unilateral disarmament from the Vest.  We are
 for equality, for consideration for the interests of both sides, for
 honest agreement.  We are ready for this.
 90.  Ustinov, TASS interview (PRAVDA, 7 Dec 82)
 91.  [President Ronald Reagan) said in his speech of 22 November that
 the Soviet Union now has a clear margin in practically any type of
 military power.  Such assertions are not in keeping with reality.
 They are calculated at deceiving the public and have the purpose of
 justifying the United States' unprecedented military programs and
 aggressive doctrines.  It is regrettable that such attempts to
 convince people of the existence of what does not exist in nature,
 are made by the leader of a great power whose very position
 presupposes realism and responsibility in assessing rea   y.   .-.---
 92.                   At the same time, the President's speech contains an attempt to
 sow distrust in the Soviet Union's stand.  He stated that the Soviet
 Union violates the unilateral moratorium it announced on the
 deployment of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the
 USSR.  I state quite definitely that the USSR is true to its word.
 93.  Andropov, PRAVDA interview responding to President Reagan's Open
 Letter (PRAVDA, 2 Feb 83)
 94.  I must say quite definitely that there is nothing new in
 President R. Reagan's proposal.  What it is all about--and this all
 the world's news agencies have immediately taken note of--is the same
 "zero option." That it is patently unacceptable to the Soviet Union
 now is already generally recognized.  Really, can one seriously speak
 about a proposal according to which the Soviet Union would have to
 scrap unilaterally all its medium-range missiles, while the United
 States and its NATO allies would retain all their nuclear weapons of
 this category?
 95.  It is precisely this unrealistic position of the United States
 that has blocked, and this is well known, progress at the talks in
 Geneva.  That now the U.S. President has reiterated again this
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 position indicates one thing: The United States does not want to look
 for a mutually acceptable accord with the Soviet Union and thereby
 deliberately dooms the Geneva talks to failure. . . .
 96.  We have believed and still believe that summit meetings have
 special significance to resolving complicated problems.  This
 determines our serious approach to them.
 97.  For us this is not a matter of a political or a propaganda game.
 A meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the United States aimed
 at finding mutually acceptable solutions to urgent problems and at
 developing relations between our countries, would be useful both to
 the Soviet Union and to the United States of America, to Europe, and
 to the whole world.
 98.   But when the U.S. President makes the meeting conditional on the
 Soviet Union's consent to the patently unacceptable solution to the
 problem of nuclear armaments in Europe, proposed by him, this by no
 means testifies to the seriousness of the American leadership's
 approach to the whole of this issue.  This can only be regretted.
 99.   Andropov, PRAVDA interview (PRAVDA, 27 Mar 83)
 100.  The President pretends that almost a thousand medium-range
 nuclear systems of the United States and it_s_ NATO allies da not ostensibly exist in the zone of Europe, and that it is unknown to him
 that NATO has a 1.5-1 advantage over the USSR in the aggregate number
 of nuclear warheads on those systems.
 101.  The President not only keeps silent about all that.  He tells a
 deliberate untruth [on govorit zavedomuyu nepravduj, asserting that
 the Soviet Union does not observe its own unilateral moratorium on
 the deployment of medium-range missiles. . . .
 102.  The incumbent U.S. Administration continues to tread an
 extremely perilous path.  The issues of war and peace must not be
 treated so flippantly.  All attempts at achieving military
 superiority over the USSR are futile. . . . It is time they stopped
 devising one option after another in search of the best ways of
 unleashing nuclear war in the hope of winning it.  Engaging in this
 is not just irresponsible, it is insane.
 103.  Andropov, speech to CPSU Central Committee plenum (PRAVDA, 16
 Jun 83)
 104.  This period is marked by a confrontation, unprecedented in the
 entire post-war period by its intensity and sharpness, of two
 diametrically opposite world outlooks, two political
 courses--socialism and imperialism.  A struggle is going on for the
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 minds and hearts of billions of people in the world.  And the future
 of mankind depends in no small measure on the outcome of this
 ideological struggle. ...It is no less important to skillfully expose
 the lying, subversive nature of imperialist propaganda. . . .
 105.  On the one hand, as has already been said, the aggressiveness
 of ultrareactionary forces led by U.S. imperialism has sharply
 increased.  Attempts are being made to reverse the course of events
 at all costs.  Of course, this policy will not bring imperialists
 success but, being adventuristic, it is extremely dangerous to
 mankind. This is why it is meeting with powerful opposition on the
 part of the peoples, which, undoubtedly, will grow even further.
 106.  In the present-day capitalist world, however, there are also
 other trends and other politicians who take a more realistic account
 of the international situation.
 107.  Gromyko, TASS interview (PRAVDA, 22 Jun 83)
 108.  Naturally, a [summit] meeting which could produce major results
 for both bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations and the international
 situation would be useful.
 109.  Quite a few words are now being said in the Vest, particularly
 in Washington, about a Soviet-American summit.  An outsider can even
 get the impression that Washington is indeed giving serious thought
 to such a meeting.  But if we look into the crux of the matter, the
 situation, regrettably, is different.
 110.  Obviously, proper preconditions are needed to hold a meeting of
 the top leaders of the two major powers.  First, it is necessary to
 have a certain degree of mutual understanding on major issues which
 are fundamental to the state of relations between the two countries
 and the overall international situation.  There also is a need for
 the desire of both sides actually to strive for positive
 developments, or even better, for a breakthrough in their mutual
 relations.
 111.  If we consider the state of affairs from this point of view, it
 becomes clear that the discourses of American figures on a meeting
 are not backed by anything.  U.S. policy on relations with the Soviet
 Union does not pursue any constructive goals at all, of which
 American leaders make no secret.  Moreover, it is oriented in the
 totally opposite direction.
 112.  When there appear in American politics real signs of a
 readiness to conduct affairs in a serious and constructive manner,
 the question of the possibility of a summit will appear in a
 different light.
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 113.  TASS statement on Korean airline incident (PRAVDA, 3 Sep 83)
 114.  The intrusion into the air space by the aforementioned plane
 cannot be regarded in any other way than a preplanned act.     It was
 obviously thought possible to attain special intelligence aims
 without hindrance using civilian planes as a cover.  -
 115.  More than that, there is reason to believe that those who
 organized this provocation deliberately desired a further aggravation
 of the international situation striving to smear the Soviet Union, to
 sow hostility towards it and to cast aspersions on the Soviet
 peace-loving policy.
 116.  This is illustrated also by the impudent, slanderous statement
 in respect to the Soviet Union that was made instantly by President
 Reagan of the United States.
 117.  USSR Government statement on Korean airliner incident (PRAVDA,
 7 Sep 83)
 118.  The assertion of the U.S. President that Soviet pilots knew
 that it was a civilian aircraft are absolutely not in keeping with
 reality.  . . .
 119.  It is the sovereign right of every state to protect its
 borders. .  . . So the U.S. President makes himself out as an
 ignoramus saying, as he did in his address on 5 September, that the
 Soviet Union "arbitrarily proclaims" its borders in the airspace
 [sic].
 120.  But the point here, of course, is not the ignorance of one U.S.
 official or another.  The point is a deliberate preplanned action in
 an area that is strategically important to the Soviet Union.  The
 instigators of that action could not help realizing what its outcome
 could be, but vent ahead with a major intelligence operation with the
 use, as is now becoming clear, of a civilian plane, deliberately
 exposing its passengers to mortal danger. . . .
 121.  This conclusion is confirmed by all subsequent actions of the
 U.S Administration.  Its leaders, including the U.S. President,
 launched a malicious and hostile anti-Soviet campaign over a very
 short time, clearly using a prearranged script.  Its essence has been
 revealed in its most concentrated form in the televised speech of
 U.S. President R. Reagan :on 5 September--to try to blacken the image
 of the Soviet Union and discredit its social system, to provoke a
 feeling of hatred toward the Soviet people, to present the aims of
 the USSR foreign policy in a distorted perspective, and to distract
 attention from its peace initiatives.
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 122.  The entire responsibility for this tragedy rests wholly and
 fully with the leaders of the United States of America.
 123.  Ogarkov article (IZVESTIYA, 23 Sep 83)
 124.  The struggle for peace in our times has acquired special
 significance.  That is due primarily to the sharply enhanced
 aggressiveness of international imperialism, Zionism, and reaction
 headed by the United States.  In recent years their actions have been
 significantly reminiscent of fascism's actions in the thirties.
 Having adopted flagrant lies and slander, the United States and its
 allies have launched a global offensive against socialism on all
 fronts, initiating, as they openly assert, a new "crusade" against
 us.  The Washington Administration is nurturing sinister plans.
 Expatiating on its alleged adherence to peace, the U.S.
 Administration, through its defense secretary, blasphemously states
 that "the path to peace is marked by preparation for war." The
 "directive in the defense field for fiscal 1984," drafted on
 instructions from the U.S. President, is evidence of how far the U.S.
 "hawks" have gone.  This official document sets as its main aim "the
 destruction of socialism as a sociopolitical system." That's allt
 There is no need to explain this gibberish.  Commentary is
 superfluous, as they say.  We can only marvel at the sheer ignorance
 and self-sufficiency of the transatlantic strategists, so infinitely
 far removed from a knowledge of the elementary  ou-n atfons an   "w-----
 of the development of human society.
 125.  Andropov statement (PRAVDA, 29 Sep 83)
 126.  The Soviet leadership deems it necessary to inform the Soviet
 people, other peoples, and all who are responsible for determining
 states' policy of its assessment of the course pursued in
 international affairs by the current U.S. Administration.
 127.  In short, it is a militarist course that represents a serious
 threat to peace.  Its essence is to try to ensure a dominating
 position in the world for the United States of America regardless of
 the interests of other states and peoples. . . .
 128.  When the U.S. President bombastically declares from the UN
 rostrum his commitment to the cause of peace, self-determination, and
 sovereignty of the peoples, these rhetorical declarations can
 convince no one.
 129.  If anyone has any illusions about the possibility of an
 evolution for the better in the present American Administration's
 policy, recent events have dispelled them once and for all.  The
 Administration is going so far for the sake of achieving its imperial
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 objectives that one cannot help doubting whether any restraints
 [tormoza] at all exist for Washington to prevent it from crossing a
 line before which any thinking person ought to stop.
 130.  The sophisticated provocation organized by the U.S. special
 services using a South Korean plane is also an example of extreme
 adventurism in policy. . . .
 131.  In their endeavor somehow to justify their dangerous,
 misanthropic policy, they are heaping mountains of slander on the
 Soviet Union and socialism as a social system, and the tone is being
 set by the U.S. President himself.  It must be frankly said that it
 is an unseemly spectacle when, having set themselves the aim of
 denigrating the Soviet people, the leaders of a country like the
 United States resort to what is virtually foul-mouthed abuse mingled
 with hypocritical sermons on morality and humanity. . . .
 132.  Now Washington, in addition to morality, is also flouting
 elementary rules of decency, displaying disrespect not only for
 statesmen and states but also.for the United Nations. . . .
 133.  Of course, malicious attacks on the Soviet Union arouse in us a
 natural sense of indignation, but we have strong nerves, and we do
 not build our policy on emotions.  It is founded on common sense,
 realism, and profound responsibility for the destiny of peace.
 134.                        Report of Politburo meeting (PRAVDA, 8 Oct 83)
 135.  [The 28 September Andropov] statement gives a clear-cut class
 analysis of the situation that has taken shape in the world, a
 principled appraisal of the militarist course stirred by the present
 U.S. Administration in international politics, and a fitting rebuff
 to wanton fabrications and malicious attacks of President Reagan
 against the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist
 community.
 136.  Ustinov article (PRAVDA, 19 Nov 83)
 137.  The aggressiveness of ultrareactionary imperialist forces
 increased sharply when the R. Reagan Administration came to power in
 the United States.  They have declared a "crusade" against socialism.
 138.  The R. Reagan Administration, in blatant contradiction with
 this commitment, is now stating its "right" to inflict a first
 nuclear strike in the hope of victory. . . .
 139.  The Washington Administration's war preparations are
 accompanied by shameless anti-Soviet hysteria.  Discarding all
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 decency, top U.S.  officials are slandering the USSR, its people and
 policy, and the socialist way of life.  Lies, disinformation,
 juggling with facts, and provocations are being brought into play.
 It is'with the aid of such methods that Washington figures, heating
 up the international situation, are counting on ensuring the
 unobstructed implementation of their course aimed at an unrestrained
 arms race.  This policy on the part of the White House leaders does
 not consist solely of emotions or rhetoric.  It is a consciously and
 coldly and deliberately implemented long-term strategy aimed at
 broadening confrontation and thus increasing the danger of war.
 140.  Andropov statement (PRAVDA, 25 Nov 83)
 141.  The leadership of the Soviet Union has already apprised Soviet
 people and other peoples of its assessment of the present U.S.
 Administration's militarist course and warned the U.S. Government and
 the, Western countries which are at one with it about the dangerous
 consequences of that course. . . .
 142.  The Soviet leadership appeals to the leaders of the United
 States and of the states of Western Europe to weigh up once again all
 the consequences with which the implementation of the plans for the
 deployment of the new U.S. missiles in Europe threatens their own
 peoples and all mankind.
 143.  We are already living, even now, in a peace that is too
 fragile.  Responsible statesmen must therefore evaluate what is
 taking place and make a rational decision.  Only human reason can and
 must safeguard mankind from the awesome danger.  We call upon those
 who are nudging the world along the path of an ever more dangerous
 arms race to renounce the unrealizable calculations of achieving
 military superiority by such a path with the aim of dictating their
 will to other peoples and states.
 144.  Gromyko speech at Conference on Disarmament in Europe (PRAVDA,
 19 Jan 84)
 145.  Instead of conducting talks and displaying a desire to work for
 accord, the U.S. Administration has chosen a course of breaking the
 existing alignment of forces. . . .
 146.  The incumbent U.S. Administration is an administration thinking
 in categories of war and acting accordingly. . . .
 147.  What is needed is deeds and not verbal equilibristics, the
 resort to which has been made particularly often in Washington
 lately. They clearly are a sign of short-term considerations, and
 people already know sufficiently well the worth of such tricks.  No
 matter how hard one tries to lie--be it a crude lie or a virtuoso
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 one--this will change nothing in the actual state of affairs.  What
 is needed is a turn of substance in policy--from the policy of
 militarism and aggression to a policy of peace and international
 cooperation.
 148.  Andropov interview (PRAVDA, 25 Jan 84)
 149.  Interstate relations have found themselves in an atmosphere of
 dangerous tension.  The leaders of the United States, the U.S.
 Administration bear full responsibility for this turn of events.
 150.  So, one may ask, why is the present situation in the world
 being deliberately distorted in the statements of. American leaders?
 First of all to try to dispel the concern of the peoples, which has
 been mounting with every day, over Washington's militaristic policy
 and to undercut the growing resistance-to this policy. . . .
 151.  There is no need to convince us of the usefulness and
 expedience of dialogue.  This is our policy.  But the dialogue should
 be conducted on an equal footing and not from a position of strength,
 as it is proposed by Ronald Reagan.  The dialogue should not be
 conducted for the sake of dialogue.  It should be directed at the
 attainment of concrete accords.  It should be conducted honestly and
 no attempts should be made to use it for_sefi~aims
 152.  The American leadership, as all signs indicate, has not given
 up its intentions to conduct talks with us from positions of
 strength, from positions of threats and pressure.
 154.  Oleg Anichkin, CPSU Central Committee official (Soviet domestic
 radio, 14Nov 80)
 155.  Reagan is in favor of stepping up American military might and
 the achievement of U.S. military supremacy. . . .
 156.  At the same time his advisers direct attention to such points.
 The nearer Reagan has approached the White House, the more moderate
 have been his enunciations.  One can suppose that this process will
 continue.
 157.  Aleksandr Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer and reputed
 adviser to Presidents Brezhnev and Andropov (Soviet domestic radio, 7
 Dec 80)
 158.  Reagan, of course, realizes that he cannot get away from
 continuing talks with the Soviet Union.  But, by all accounts, it
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 seems to me, in general, that a harder line U.S. policy is at hand,
 particularly where it concerns, for example, the problems of
 disarmament and military detente.  It seems to me that soon we will
 have to confront a harder line of this kind and preparations for this
 should be made, although in general I do not exclude the possibility
 that after a while everything may return to the beaten track, as we
 say.
 159.  Georgiy Arbatov, director of the USA and Canada Institute
 (Soviet television, 29 Nov 80)
 160.  It has become clear in any case that both Reagan and many in
 his entourage have come to some serious conclusions during the course
 of this campaign.  The shift to the center has begun.  This is
 generally typical of U.S. political life.  Whichever candidate stands
 away from the center will shift.  If he is left of center, he will
 drift to the right.  If he is right of center, he will drift slightly
 to the left remaining at some distance, but even so will approach the
 center.  Reagan is a rather experienced man in this respect.  I would
 like to say that I have heard and read in the foreign press that as a
 film actor he is a man without much experience.  However, it is
 difficult to judge from the past.  There were excellent presidents
 who were former loggers..
 161.  The fact itself that moderate statements are made s
 important to me, because quite a few obstacles were left over from
 the election campaign.  This certainly does not mean that we will be
 rancorous and will not let anything pass, including what was said in
 the heat of the election struggle.  We have already said publicly
 that we will not act like that.  However, even words are deeds to a
 certain extent at present, because they influence atmosphere and
 climate.  Atmosphere and climate are rather important in politics and
 any beginnings depend on them.
 162.  Vitaliy Kobysh, CPSU Central Committee official (LITERATURNAYA
 GAZETA, 1Jan 81)
 163.  Reagan, with his reputation for being a politician belonging to
 the extreme right wing of the Republican Party, has formed his
 cabinet from people of basically moderate views. . . .
 164.  "When taking over," every new administrator strives to show
 that it is different from the previous one and that its policy will
 meet the country's interests to a greater degree.  Statements by
 Reagan and some of his closest assistants indicate that they consider
 the status to which the Carter-Brzezinski administration has reduced
 Soviet-U.S. relations to be abnormal and that they see the
 normalization of these relations as the next U.S. Government's
 foremost priority.  At the same time they stress that they will
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 pursue a "tough policy," in other words, they will act from a
 "position of strength." We will see how all this will appear in
 practice.
 165.  TASS report on President Reagan's 29 January press conference
 (PRAVDA, 31 Jan 81)
 166.  Referring to the Soviet Union's policy, the U.S. President
 permitted a number of premeditated distortions in his assessment of
 the aims-and character of the USSR's international activities.  He
 said, in particular, that up to now detente has been a one-way street
 which the Soviet Union has used for the achievement of its own aims,
 and that detente is more favorable to the Soviet Union than to the
 United States. . . .
 167.  In an unworthy manner Reagan went on to talk about some sort of
 insidiousness in the Soviet Union's policy which allegedly aims to
 establish a worldwide socialist or communist state. . . .
 168.  Referring to a most important problem, the SALT II treaty, the
 President permitted obvious misinterpretations [perederzhki] of the
 treaty's essence.  He alleged that in its present form the treaty
 would lead not to strategic arms limitation but to their buildup.  He
 called for the holding of new negotiations.  However, it followed
 from Reagan's statement that the principal function of such
 negotiations will not be the discussion of conditions for limiting
 the arms race, but the linking of this problem to other questions
 which are not relevant to this topic.
 169.  Anichkin (Soviet domestic radio, 6 Feb 81)
 170.  On the whole President Reagan [at his press conference on 29
 January] said nothing new in comparison with what he said during the
 election campaign.  He attributed to the Soviet Union designs to
 establish world domination and to set up a worldwide socialist or
 communist state.  Then he declared that the Soviet Union is using
 detente for its own ends and has allegedly turned it into a one-way
 street.  All of this is untrue. . . .
 171.  It is one thing when minor politicians are talking in this
 spirit; it is another when such words are being pronounced by the
 President.  After all, it is a question of the deliberate distortion
 of Soviet policy....
 172.  In the words of the WASHINGTON POST, Reagan had adopted a tone
 which is very strikingly different form the Republican and Democratic
 administrations of the 60's and 70's.  The President, the same
 newspaper writes, spoke of the Soviet Union in terms that recall the
 most difficult times of the cold war.
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 173.  "I. Aleksandrov," pseudonym used in officially inspired
 articles (PRAVDA, 25 Mar 81)
 174.  Regretfully, from their very first public statements and
 practical steps the leaders of the new U.S. Government appear to be
 bent not on rectifying but on multiplying the errors of the previous
 administration, on facilitating not a lessening of international
 tension but its growth. . . .
 175.  The leaders of the Washington Administration and some hawkish
 lawmakers are now engaged in a competition of belligerent
 phraseology, are trying to outdo one another by the hugeness of
 military programs.
 176.  Bovin (Soviet television, 29 Mar 81)
 177.  I now think that the essential outlines of the new foreign
 policy course, of Reagan's foreign policy, have now become
 sufficiently visible.  It is a harsh, conservative, power policy, it
 is a policy whose cornerstone comprises extremely primitive
 anticommunist concepts.  In general the views of Reagan and his
 supporters on world developments are extremely simple: Anything they
 do not like, anything that is contrary to the interests of
 imperialism, they say is all the result of the insidious actions of
 the Soviet Union.  From this primitive package a simple conclusion is
 drawn: The time for playing at detente is over, it is necessary to
 rearm immediately, it is necessary to strive for military strategic
 superiority over the Soviet Union, and on this basis impose the will
 of America the Great on the whole world.
 178.  Well, this is approximately the philosophy.  Let us now examine
 the practice.  We all know that during the past decade, let us say,
 despite all the difficulties and complexities, between the Soviet
 Union and the United States there became established a fairly
 well-developed structure of mutual relations which was formulated in
 dozens of different agreements.  Nov the new Administration is
 beginning to break up this structure and deal a mean blow to its
 foundation, the process of strategic arms limitation.
 179.  Arbatov (PRAVDA, 4 May 81)
 180.  Most observers agree that, even by late April, no in any way
 coherent U.S. foreign policy has emerged--at any rate when it comes
 to actions.  There have been plenty of words and rhetoric--so much
 that the Administration itself has more than once had to backpedal.
 But can words and rhetoric be regarded as policy?
 181.  They probably can be, in some respects.
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 182.  First of all, they can shed light on political views and
 intentions.  In this light the "noises" from Washington are almost
 unambiguous: They indicate a desire to accelerate the arms race in
 every possible way and to secure military superiority, a wish to
 switch relations with the USSR and the other socialist countries onto
 the road of confrontation and power struggle, to rule according to
 whim the fate of the countries that have liberated themselves from
 colonialism, to dictate unceremoniously to the allies.  The very fact
 that the people who have come to power in the United States talk at
 length and insistently of these desires and intentions cannot be left
 out of account.  The fact must be viewed as an objective reality.
 But another fact remains no less a reality--the fact that intentions
 and wishes alone are not enough to constitute a policy.  Politics has
 been and will remain the art of the possible.  And the possibilities,
 the realities of the modern world certainly do not leave a great deal
 of room for the imperial ambitions which people in Washington are
 today going on about with new force.
 183.  The question whether the new U.S. Administration has formulated
 its foreign policy should be left'open, I think.  Some may hope that
 it has not been formulated yet, others may think differently.  It is
 clear, however, that the continuation of the existing situation would
 itself pose grave dangers, particularly the attempts to transform
 bombastic propaganda slogans into practical policy premises.  All
 this is dangerous not only for other countries
 United States itself and for its national interests, which need more
 than ever before a realistic, sober analysis.
 184.  Leonid Zamyatin, chief of the CPSU Central Committee
 International Information Department (Soviet television, 16 May 81)
 185.  On many questions the foreign policy concept of the new Reagan
 Administration has already been formulated. . . .
 186.  On the basis of speeches, although at times you could say they
 are quite saturated with anti-Soviet rhetoric, and on the basis of
 documents which have already been published, it can be definitely
 concluded that the new U.S. Administration has chosen a sharp
 whipping up of the arms race as its course.  The new Administration
 considers that opposition to the Soviet Union--as its leaders, the
 leaders of the United States, say--in the economic, political, and
 other fields is its main foreign policy concept.  Besides, they
 maintain that this opposition must be on a global scale.
 187.  Reagan recently said: I do not wish to live in a world where
 the Soviet Union is first.  What does this mean?  If these words of
 Reagan's are translated into another language--into the language of
 politics from everyday language--this means that the United States
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 has chosen military supremacy over the Soviet Union as its political
 concept; that it is rejecting the policy of peaceful coexistence, the
 policy of detente; and that it is making a stake on sharply raising
 the military presence of the United States in various parts of the
 world, including along the perimeter of Soviet borders.  It is also
 attempting, by increasing its military potential, to put pressure on
 the Soviet Union.
 188.  Arbatov (Soviet Television, 31 Oct 81)
 189.  If we are to speak about American policy, then of course we can
 say that the most extremist views have prevailed in the question of
 military spending, and generally in American behavior in the
 international arena.  Well, of course, many say that maybe these
 people bark more than they bite.  It is still difficult and too early
 to judge.  But they do in fact bark a lot, and a lot of militaristic
 talk can be heard coming from Washington every day.  This is not just
 talk.  There are military appropriation decisions on military
 programs, certain U.S. positions and actions on various continents,
 and interference into the affairs of a number of countries--all of
 this has become a reality.  Therefore, we are undoubtedly seeing a
 period which gives cause to remember the cold war and to suspect that
 quite a lot has been done to sweep aside all the positive things that
 were accumulated at the expense of great labor in international
 relations and thus a big step has been taken toward a cold war. . . .
 190.  So things in the economy are not turning out quite the way the
 President figured, and to a certain extent this can be a limiting
 factor for many far-reaching American plans. . . .
 191.  All of these realities are just beginning to appear--after all
 this government has not been in power very long--and these political
 and social mechanisms, which demand some kind of accommodation on the
 part of the Administration, have just been set in motion.
 192.  Of course, there are people there who     . it is difficult to
 imagine that they can reform.  But overall--and we have seen this in
 history more than once--even the most conservative politicians have
 been sufficiently pragmatic in understanding what can be done and
 what cannot be done. . . .
 193.  Even in America, they are beginning to somehow understand that
 the question is becoming extremely acute, that some kind of reaction
 to it is necessary, that in Europe and the world as a whole--and even
 in the United States, as a matter of fact--some sentiments are
 appearing.
 194.  Bovin, Soviet domestic radio, 29 November 1981
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 195.  In fact, what did this Reagan speech of 18 November mean?  Does
 it, to some degree. . . . signify a reassessment of the U.S.
 position, or . . . is it an attempt to gain a political alibi with
 respect to the pressures being exerted by America's allies in Europe?
 As for which of these elements was more evident in the speech, this
 is an open question both for us and for Europe.  We will find out
 when the talks begin.
 196.  Nikolay Shishlin, CPSU Central Committee official, Soviet
 television, 5 December 1981
 197.  Regarding the fact of an alteration in the U.S. foreign policy
 course taking place, an alteration in the U.S. foreign policy course
 beginning to become perceptible--this is true. . . . It seems that in
 this respect in particular we are right in talking neither of a
 cosmetic operation nor of a break with,past policies, but rather of a
 certain alteration in course, a certain adaptation of American
 policies to reality.
 198.  Bovin, Soviet domestic radio, 20 December 1981
 199.  One of the main problems for Europe at the moment is the
 problem of the so-called Eurostrategic weapons. . . . One can view
 these [INF] talks in different ways.  On the one hand, the talks have
 a specific object--medium-range weapons.  But their principal
 significance is the fact that after a woe year of-a  -zion-an----
 alarm and hysterical kinds of statements by Washington, generally
 speaking things there are quietly beginning to stabilize.
 200.  TASS report on U.S. sanctions after the imposition of martial
 law in Poland (PRAVDA, 30 Dec 81)
 201.  The U.S. Administration has taken a provocative step the
 purpose of which is to poison the international climate even more, to
 exacerbate tensions, to worsen confrontation and toughen the
 militarist foreign policy course. . . .
 202.  President R. Reagan has published a statement, announcing the
 introduction of a whole number of unilateral discriminatory measures
 with regard to the Soviet Union, ranging from a suspension of
 Aeroflot service to the USA to a review of bilateral Soviet-U.S.
 agreements in trade and scientific-technical cooperation, agreements
 signed by the Government of the United States.
 203.  To justify this crude diktat with regard to a sovereign state
 unprecedented and absolutely inadmissible in universally accepted
 international practice, the head of the U.S. Administration has
 resorted to direct forgery and lies, maintaining that the Soviet
 Union allegedly "interfered" in Polish affairs and bears "direct
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 responsibility" for the situation in Poland.
 204.  Arbatov (PRAVDA, 1 Jan 82)
 Page: 82    of 92
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 205.  "Seeking a crisis" is precisely how Washington's stance
 regarding Poland can be described. . . . Attempts are being made to
 "internationalize" the crisis and to exploit the events to still
 further exacerbate the international situation and relations with the
 USSR in particular.
 206.  The question naturally arises of the true motives and true aims
 of the campaign unleashed by the United States over the events in
 Poland. . . .
 207.  I want immediately to stipulate that in mentioning the present
 leaders, I mean not only the President and his most influential
 ministers but also a broader stratum of the Washington bureaucracy,
 above all the stratum comprising the deputy and assistant cabinet
 members, the President's chief advisers and entourage, the heads of a
 number of departments, and so forth. . . . And with the utmost
 responsibility I would venture to claim that as a group, this "second
 echelon" is in considerable part composed of extremists representing
 the far right wing, extreme militarist flank of the U.S. ruling
 class. . . . A whole series of conclusions can be derived from all
 that is known of these people.  One is that they are people who rose
 to prominence on a wave of crisis and feel    e   s   u- of-water--  -
 outside a crisis. . . .
 208.  A certain circle of American figures now needs a crisis as a
 condition of its political success, even political survival.  And it
 is apparently prepared to go to any lengths for the sake of that.
 209.  Aleksandr Kaverznev, Soviet television political observer
 (Hungarian domestic radio, 18 Feb 82)
 210.  We are of the opinion that the coming years will be difficult.
 In the beginning, when the Reagan Administration came to power in the
 United States, we had certain hopes that the President would not
 implement the policy he announced during his election campaign.  We
 hoped that life would oblige him to see many things in a different
 way.  But now we are forced to conclude that for the entire duration
 of the Reagan Administration we can hardly expect a different U.S.
 policy.
 211.  Shishlin (Soviet domestic radio, 11 Apr 82)
 212.  Reagan, it must be said, has garnished these rather bellicose
 statements with the somewhat curious assertion that he, the President
 of the United States, is willing to meet Leonid Ilich Brezhnev in the
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 summer at the second special session of the UN General Assembly on
 disarmament.  And there is a rather strange contradiction here.
 Actually, the idea of a summit meetinj=-a Soviet-American summit
 meeting--was proposed over one year ago from the platform of the 26th
 party congress.  In that time, the Soviet Union has covered a
 considerable part of the distance toward finding ground for mutually
 acceptable solutions in the interests of improving Soviet-American
 relations.  We saw nothing of the kind from the American side.  And
 now into the midst of these rather definite statements, which can
 only be called militaristic, he inserts the claim that he is ready
 for a Soviet-American summit meeting.
 213.  Ernst Genri, prominent journalist (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 14 Jul
 82)
 214.  Consequently, has the failure of Hitler's blitzkrieg against
 the USSR taught the U.S. militarists nothing?  By all accounts, this
 is exactly the case and must be taken into account.  It is not hard
 to understand what is guiding the Pentagon's thinkers.
 215.  They are not taking the failure of the Hitlerite adventure into
 account simply because there has been a revolution in military
 hardware since then.  It is now proposed to deliver a surprise strike
 against the USSR not by means of tanks and conventional aircraft, but
 by nuclear missiles and other "super weapons" whichcan__fly_thousands
 of kilometers in a few minutes.
 216.  Arbatov (PRAVDA, 16 Jul 82)
 217.  U.S. policy would be good to the extent to which it is not
 allowed to be bad, safe (not only for us but also for America itself
 and its allies) to the extent to which it is not allowed to become
 dangerous.  It will not be allowed to evolve in those directions by
 economic and political realities, by the policies of other countries,
 by the Americans' common sense and by the striving of the peoples for
 self-preservation.  I hope that these factors will be enough for the
 continued political processes to bolster the realistic principles and
 to return American policy to an understanding of not only the
 existing contradictions but also of very serious and vitally
 important common interests, the interests of peace and survival,
 which require not only talks but also agreements as well as the
 overall improvement of relations between the two countries.  What if
 this does not come to pass?  I personally would find solace in the
 thought that a time will come and it will be possible to say: It is
 not with this Administration that history began, and it is not with
 it that it has ended.
 218.  Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central
 Committee International Department (Czechoslovak domestic radio, 30
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 Jul 82)
 219.  Reagan and his Administration--and I deliberately do not say
 the United States since there are various internal groupings--Reagan
 and his Administration represent that part of the capitalist world of
 monopoly capital, which is convinced that the solution of questions
 of the future, of problems of mutual relations between the two
 systems, can be achieved only by means of force.  Circles currently
 in the leadership of a substantial part of European countries take a
 completely different viewpoint.  It is not easy for them but they
 give preference to a peaceful development of relations and to solving
 questions by competition in a peaceful atmosphere. . . .
 220.  Extreme views exist; there are people who say that the
 situation is so complex and difficult that there is no way out, that
 only the worst can be expected, that we are on the very threshold of
 war.  That of course is an extreme view and is incorrect because
 there are a number of positive factors; the head-on struggle and
 existing equilibrium of forces is a guarantee that we can advance and
 not allow imperialism to realize its plans.
 221.  On the other hand there are some people who say that there have
 been all kinds of crises; this will pass, too.  We are strong; we
 have the strength of the Soviet Union, the strength of the socialist
 countries; it will all pass of its own accord.  It will not pass of
 its own accord; of course that, too, is  nc ro rect.
 222.                        Yes, without doubt we are capable of defending ourselves, of
 rebuffing the imperialist wave, but that depends on us, on the
 situation of our countries and in our countries, on the unity of our
 countries and their joint activity in the international arena.
 223.  Bovin (IZVESTIYA, 6 Aug 82)
 224.  In general it is hard to deal with the Americans now.  They
 dissemble, twist and turn, say one thing and do another.  They have
 many ambitions and a great deal of self-esteem.  They have little
 responsibility.  But what can you do?  We do not choose our partners,
 they are given us by destiny, by history.  We have to talk and
 negotiate with them although, to be frank, I do not believe that any
 serious agreement can be reached with the Americans as long as Reagan
 is in the White House.
 225.  Vladimir Ostrogorskiy, commentator (Moscow radio in German, 22
 Aug 82)
 226.  If Reagan knew history better and made its lessons his own, he
 would not harbor any illusions, since there were people before him
 who, like Hitler, had a special liking for using the miraculous
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 weapon of inflammatory propaganda on the air.
 It is typical for
 aspirants to world domination to rely on miraculous weapons.      It is,
 however, well known how they usually have ended.
 227.  Bovin (IZVESTIYA, 5 Nov 82)
 228.  Nov let us allow the skeptic to have his say.  He is bound to
 ask: Are we not overestimating our own strength?  Can international
 security and international cooperation seriously be expected when the
 world is divided into opposing sociopolitical systems?  Is the
 "Reagan phenomenon" an accident?  The questions are not farfetched.
 The difficulties are indeed huge.  Militarism and aggressiveness are
 inherent in imperialism.          We do not choose our partners; fate,
 history hands them to us.
 229.  All that is true.           Nonetheless, the hope is realistic.  The
 hope is realistic because the forces advocating that detente get a
 "second wind" represent a real, weighty factor in world politics.
 The Soviet Union is a mighty power.  People across the Atlantic
 cannot help but take this into account--whatever team is assembled in
 the White House, it is still not a suicide team.  The socialist
 community and the communist and workers' parties are with us.  Dozens
 of nonaligned states advocate detente and disarmament and oppose the
 division of the world into military-political blocs.  The
 antinuclear, antiwar movement is gaining unprecedented scope and its
 social and political spectrum is becoming ncrea ing             . . -
 230.  I repeat, we would like to reach agreement, even with Reagan.
 What if this does not happen?  We will wait.
 231.  Shishlin (Soviet domestic radio, 21 Nov 82)
 232.  Actions for the benefit of peace would carry a lot more weight
 than conciliatory words.  If we were to see a real shift in the
 American position at the talks that are being held on strategic
 armaments, on European armaments, on conventional armaments in
 Central Europe--that would surely be more substantial than the words
 spoken by the American statesmen.  So the situation remains pretty
 difficult. . . .
 233.  PRAVDA editorial (PRAVDA, 21 Nov 82)
 234.  Judging by international reactions, Andropov's meetings with
 foreign delegations gave new impetus to people's hopes for the
 maintenance and development of the detente process.  The Soviet Union
 is always ready for honest, equal, and mutually advantageous
 cooperation with any state which wishes it, particularly with the
 United States.  Normal, or better still, friendly Soviet-American
 relations would accord with the interests of both peoples and of
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 world peace.
 235.  Gennadiy Gerasimov, Novosti deputy chairman (Soviet television,.
 28 Nov 82)
 236.  The events of the last weeks in Moscow, by the very nature of
 things, have caused a certain pause in international relations. The
 world has been watching Moscow to see what will happen and, in its
 turn, Moscow has been watching the world attentively, too.  American
 Senator Robert Dole, a prominent figure in the Republican
 Party--Reagan's party--has been in Moscow during these days.  He
 stated that he observes an advancement by the Reagan Administration
 toward a new beginning--that is how he expressed himself.  Some
 observers have begun cautiously seeking signs of a thaw, even a weak
 one, in American-Soviet relations.
 237.  Arbatov, speech to U.S. trade delegation (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA,
 8 Dec 82)
 238.  In the last few days many people's hopes regarding the
 prospects of Soviet-American relations have revived.  The dramatic
 nature of the moment, when events are prompting reflection on the
 most serious problems perturbing people, may even have helped in a
 way. . . .
 239.  Something seems to be beginning to c a~iigor the Tietfer- -
 Something has happened and something positive too.  I think it is a
 good thing that ASTEC has met.  It seems to me that it is an
 important event and shows that many Americans (and Soviet people,
 too, of course) understand the fundamental interests of their
 countries and "gas for pipes" deal.  We assessed positively the
 American leaders' expression of condolences on the death of Leonid
 Ilich Brezhnev and the fact that the U.S. President personally
 visited the Soviet Embassy and sent the U.S. vice president and
 secretary of state to Moscow.  We have carefully followed the words
 spoken in this connection, and the positive [khoroshiye) words we
 have greeted positively.
 240.  But if I were asked if I could assess these facts as evidence
 of the abandonment by the United States of a policy that in our
 country--I must be frank with you--is seen as a policy of cold war
 and as a course of a headlong arms race and of unbounded--mortal, as
 the saying goes--enmity?  [sentence as published) Or is what has
 happened in the last few days merely a maneuver aimed at reassuring
 the public at large and the allies so that they do not prevent this
 policy of total enmity from being pursued in the future?  If I were
 asked those questions, I would honestly say that as yet I have no
 answer.
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 241.  Bovin (Soviet television, 30 Dec 82)
 242.  It is difficult to escape the impression that the opponents of
 detente in Washington are gradually beginning to give ground.       I
 would even risk making the following conclusion: The isolation of
 Reagan and his policy is growing both within the United States and
 outside it.  Evidently, we can assume that this will force the White
 House to intensify its maneuvering.  But at the moment it is
 difficult to say whether this will affect the essence of the foreign
 policy course or only its form, as has already been the case.
 243.  Commentators Aleksandr Korshunov and Oleg Blinov (Soviet
 domestic radio, 12 Jan 83)
 244.  At the end of his [latest radio] speech, Reagan stated the
 readiness of the United States--and I quote--to sit down at the
 conference table with the Russians to discuss practical measures
 capable of resolving the problems and leading to a more durable and
 genuine improvement of relations between East and Vest.  If this is
 really so, then one can only welcome the U.S. President's utterances.
 The Soviet Union believes that the path toward mutual talks is open
 and that our two countries could make an important contribution to
 the cause of creating a climate of mutual trust, mutual understanding
 and cooperation in the world.
 245.  His Holiness Pimen, Patriarch of lfioscow--arid ~Yl Russia fTf1SE,
 Apr 83)
 246.  It is with bitterness and grief in my heart that I read your
 belligerent calls which sow the seeds of hatred and hostility against
 my motherland and threaten peace all over the world.  These calls are
 the more sinful as they are wrapped in the attire of Christian
 morals. . . .
 247.  But you, Mr. President, teach war in your remarks; you teach
 war against my nation and my motherland.  Can one really be faithful
 to the commandment thou shalt not kill and at the same time speak
 about the possibility of a limited nuclear war, about total nuclear
 war, first nuclear strike, victory in a nuclear war and other
 criminal and sinful conceptions?  War, war, war. . . and where is the
 place for thou shalt not kill, Mr. President?
 248.  Valentin Zorin, Soviet television political observer (Moscow
 radio [in English] to North America, 3 Apr 83)
 249.  But the leaders in Washington are not only rude and tactless in
 their political styles, they also break another unwritten rule of
 statesmanship.  It is unfortunate when the mass media juggles with
 facts but it is inexcusable when leaders in positions of utmost
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 responsibility resort to overt lies.  There have been many instances
 when the current leaders in Washington have flagrantly distorted the
 truth and deliberately lied to the public.  That was the case in the
 most recent statements made by President Reagan about Soviet policy.
 250.  Kobysh (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 6 Apr 83)
 251.  [In his] 1 April speech and in previous speeches, R. Reagan
 cast aside all Easter rhetoric and explained quite clearly and
 bluntly that the Administration that he heads, far from intending to
 renounce its military preparations on a monstrous scale and its
 hegemonist aggressive course, actually contemplates something still
 more sinister.  Playing with words, he presented to the public in the
 guise of "ABM defense" the announcement that the United States is
 embarking on the implementation of a vast new, purely aggressive
 program of military preparations, mainly covering space.  This
 announcement was further evidence that the present U.S. Government is
 not simply preparing for nuclear war, but has set a course toward
 unleashing such a war.
 252.  Valentin Falin, IZVESTIYA political observer (IZVESTIYA, 14 Aug
 83)
 253.  And what does the U.S. leadership think now?  It links the
 maintenance of peace between our states to the United States'
 acquisition of military superiority in addition to Lhe USSR
 renunciation of a socialist social system.  In other words, the
 Soviet Union must learn to be at the United States' beck and call or
 it will only have itself to blame.  It is perfectly obvious that this
 view has nothing in common with the "Basic Principles of Mutual
 Relations between the USSR and the United States" which the U.S.
 leader sealed with his signature in May 1972. . . .
 254.  True, for some time now representatives of the present
 administration have been going in for soft-pedaling.  They have been
 transforming R. Reagan from a dashing mindless horseman into a
 soft-hearted "peace champion." A broad stream of misinformation is
 being broadcast in which they want to whitewash the U.S. stance at
 the talks on nuclear arms in Europe and on strategic arms limitation
 and reduction.
 255.  Arkadiy Sakhnin (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 5 Oct 83)
 256.  Under pressure from the peoples, imperialism seemed to accept
 the incipient detente.  But it could not keep it up.  What do you
 mean, detente?1  So much power!  Must rule the world!
 257.  A familiar turn.  We heard it from the madman [Hitler].  It was
 also heard by a smart master of ceremonies, an actor from the
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 "General Electric Theater" television program.  He was advertising
 washing machines and detergents.  He got it into his head: A career
 can be built round this tune.  He selected the words to the tune and
 rehearsed the pose of sovereign.  He uttered: "I will not end the
 ideological 'drama.'" Those who write with pain at the sound of the
 word "peace" liked the pose.  They liked the words, too.  They
 decided to give it a try and brought the actor in for a test.  They
 hauled him off the theatrical and onto the political stage.  On the
 small stage, to start with.   The familiar tune sounded louder, the
 words more threatening.  The test was successful.  On to the big
 stage.
 258.  This is how the second plenipotentiary of imperialism to lay a
 claim to world domination appeared on earth in our days.  He picked a
 team worthy of himself and settled into the White House.
 259.  Today the Second Pretender holds in his hands not a bomb but a
 nuclear missile.  He is waving it about on land, on the water, under
 the water, and in the sky, and is carrying it into space.       . Take
 the plugs out of your ears, Reagan.  Time to think about God.   That
 is what religious people would say.  But we are realists: Think about
 Nuremberg.
 260.  Aleksandr Yakovlev, director of the World Economics and
 International Relations Institute (IZVESTIYA, 7 Oct 83)
 261.  There can be no doubt that the current U.S. President is
 exerting an extremely destructive influence on the international
 situation.  His personal contribution to bringing the danger of war
 closer is great, and he bears the responsibility for the very rapid
 demolition of the structure of international cooperation built by the
 efforts of many countries on the platform of deepening and
 strengthening peace.  But at the same time R. Reagan is also carrying
 out a social instruction.  Reflecting the U.S. ruling oligarchy's
 present tasks, he has-been outstandingly assiduous in his post, as
 the whole world can see for itself. . . .
 262.  As THE LOS ANGELES TIMES notes, Reagan does not have an
 inquiring mind.  Eyewitnesses invariably stress that he has more
 horses in his stables than books in his library.  He believes in
 flying saucers, assiduously reads horoscopes, and believes in the
 actions of secret evil spirits.
 263.  A. Leontyev (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 15 Oct 83)
 264.  In an attempt to somehow justify their adopted course of war
 preparations, the new aspirants to world domination--in that sense
 too the heirs of the raving fuehrer--excel in slander against the
 Soviet Union and resort virtually to foul-mouthed abuse alternating
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 with hypocritical homilies about morality and human rights, with the
 White House incumbent himself setting the tone.
 265.  If we are to believe Reagan, America is ruled by "the most
 noble," "the most magnanimous," and "the most philanthropic"
 gentlemen.  But there is no mention of the fact that each of these
 gentlemen possesses heaps of dollars in his bank account, acquired
 from the drudgery of modern-day slaves, taken from widows and
 orphans, and collected from the corpses of soldiers who have perished
 in the dirty wars and criminal adventures of the United States.
 266.  Commentator Oleg Kolesnikov (TASS report in English, 26 Oct 83)
 267.  The crude act of international terrorism elevated by Washington
 to the status of government policy is the assessment given by the
 world public of the occupation of Grenada by the U.S. Marines.  The
 statements by President Reagan about the "peace-making" mission of
 the U.S. Marines sent by him to that tiny island in the Caribbean
 strike one as monstrous cynicism. . . .
 268.  Reagan's statements are mendacious from beginning to end, and
 even officials of the American Administration are forced to admit it.
 269.  Bovin (OTECHESTVEN FRONT, 1 Dec 84)
 270.  When the Americans agreed to detente and when they held
 constructive talks with us, this was an attempt to adapt their policy
 to the changes in life and in the world that had emerged.  Now the
 reverse process is occurring--Reagan is trying to adapt the whole
 world to the interests of the United States as he understands them.
 Such an approach, however, again undermines the realistic basis for
 any constructive agreements.  Evidence of this is the failure of the
 Geneva talks.
 271.  The dominance of a conservative, reactionary, and archaic
 ideology in the United States, an ideology which is being transformed
 to politics, is the main obstacle for regulating disputed problems.
 I think that Reagan cannot change himself.  Romain Rolland has
 actually said that one can begin to understand something of life only
 when one comes upon its sharp corners.  Reagan has already come upon
 such sharp corners but having in mind the way he understands life, I
 have not noticed that he has changed himself.  Since Reagan will
 probably stay in the White House for another four years, it is my
 belief that for that period of time we will not succeed in reaching
 an agreement on anything meaningful.  We will, of course, conduct
 negotiations, we will try to sign agreements and we will probably
 even succeed somewhere on the political fringes.  However, I think
 that concerning the main and basic issues we will have to face a game
 of nerves, confrontation, and conflicts for another four years.  This
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 is not a very optimistic prospect.             I would very much like to be
 wrong but I can draw no other conclusion at present.
 272.  Fedor Burlatskiy, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA political observer and
 CPSU Central Committee official (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 4 Jan 84)
 273.  It is impossible to deny that a serious turnabout occurred in
 U.S.  geopolitics on the threshold of the eighties, or that the
 United States has completely rejected the very idea of detente and
 has embarked on the path of global confrontation with the Soviet
 Union.  . . .
 274.  It is well known that this shift is basically linked with the
 arrival of President Reagan in the White House, a man with extremely
 reactionary views representing the interests of the "iron
 triangle"--the military business, the Pentagon, and the militarist
 wing in the U.S. Congress. . . .
 275.  [Whether the present militarist course in the United States is
 irreversible] is a very complicated question.  Much depends on
 whether R. Reagan manages to win the forthcoming U.S. election in the
 fall of 1984.  Much also depends on the correlation of forces within
 the framework of the U.S. economic and political elite and on public
 opinion in that country.
 276.  R. Reagan is hastening to consolidate the basic foundations of
 militarism for the future.  He is inflating the military budget and
 planning programs for new types of weapons.  Nonetheless, political
 forces in the United States and the U.S. people still have not had
 their final say.  I am convinced that ordinary people in the United
 States fear thermonuclear war no less than other people in the world.
 277.  TASS report on President Reagan's State of the Union Address
 (TASS, 26 Jan 84)
 278.  President Ronald Reagan made a traditional "State of the Union"
 address to a joint meeting of the two houses of Congress.  His
 statement, made in a spirit of electioneering, was an attempt to
 picture in a favorable light the results of his three-year rule and
 justify his policy, marked by extreme aggressiveness in the
 international field and total disregard for the needs of the common
 people in the home policy field.
 279.  The foreign policy section of the President's State of the
 Union address was notable for demagogy and hypocrisy.  The President
 was trying to justify his militaristic policy by claiming that "the
 United States is safer . . . and more secure in 1984 than before",
 albeit, in real fact, the threat to general security, including to
 the security of the United States itself, has increased.  And the
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 leaders of the United States bear all responsibility for such a turn
 of events.
 280.  Commentator Yuriy Kornilov (TASS, 30 Jan 84)
 281.  The U.S. Administration speaks a great deal about "the need of
 a dialogue." Yet, it deadlocks, disrupts and blocks all the talks on
 the problems of curbing the arms race. . . .
 282.  Our hands are clean, and we have never been aggressors, U.S.
 President R. Reagan pointed out recently at the Congress in the State
 of the Union message.  This is an obvious lie.  In the past 6 years
 alone the U.S. Administration resorted to armed actions or the threat
 of force against other states 38 times, . . .
 283.  The thing is that from whatever point of view we assess the
 situation, it is more than obvious: The allegedly "peace-making"
 tricks of Reagan and his team, brought about by the purely
 time-serving considerations, have nothing to do with the real foreign
 policy pursued by Washington, which is based today, the same as
 before, on the desire to make history reverse its course, to reshape
 the political map of the world.
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